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The paper examines the link between Non-state armed Islamist groups’ terrorism and
global domestic insurgency, using Nigeria as a case study. It adopts a combination of
deprivation – frustration – aggression theory, social learning and social identity theories
as its framework of analysis. The primary focus of inquiry is on secondary data, purposively
sampled from books, journals articles, and reports of periodicals, internet and existing
statistics. Qualitative research and secondary data analysis method were adopted. Using
discourse, descriptive and explanatory techniques, the paper attempts to establish the
relationship between Non-state armed Islamist groups’ support and Boko Haram
insurgency in Nigeria. Findings from the study show that Boko Haram’s insurgency is
connected with the Non-state armed Islamist groups’ support, cooperation and
collaboration. Moreover, Boko Haram insurgency is also a direct consequence of
cumulative deprivation and frustration caused by inequality, economic deprivation,
poverty, unemployment, corruption and bad governance in Nigeria. The paper concludes
by suggesting that transitional joint military taskforce should be established with
neighboring countries, while the issues of governance, socio-cultural and economic factors
that cause poverty, inequality and deprivation should be addressed through good
governance.

T
N

he Global War on Terrorism (GNOT) seized the world’s attention in late 2001 as a result
of dramatic and destructive attack of World Trade Centre in New York City and overarching
military pentagon building in Washington, DC, on September, 11 2001. The terrorist attack
was well planned, coordinated and executed. Since then, terrorism took a different form and
spreading all over the world. The number of attacks by non-state armed Islamist groups and
their collaborations with domestic insurgents around the world increased rapidly over the
years. Between 1969 and 1985, for instance, the number of major international terrorist
attacks alone jumped from just two hundred to over eight hundred per year, leaving more and
more people afraid and polarized in their opinions. According to Homeland Security News
Wire (2014), a total of 7,217 attacks were recorded. In 2013, the number increased to 18,524
(150 per cent). Throughout the world, terrorism re-invents itself in new and more dangerous
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forms. As older groups are defeated and exhausted, more radical and violent successors often
take their places. Domestic insurgencies emerged and linked to non-state armed Islamist
group networks.
Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad known as Boko Haram in Nigeria
is an extremist Islamic group that has engaged in guerrilla warfare across the Northern part
of Nigeria. It’s violent and suicide attacks on civilians, churches, government officials and
United Nations have turned the country into a theatre of bloodshed and insecurity for lives
and properties. It is on record that between January 1, 2012 and April 2014, Nigeria has
witnessed over fifty cases of bomb blasts across the county with estimated 10,000 deaths
and kidnapping of 270 girls from Government Girl’s Secondary School, Chibok, Borno
State, that has attracted international outrage (Pernice 2013).
Boko Haram Sect was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 and the organization
seeks to establish a “pure” Islamic state ruled by Sharia law, putting a stop to what it deems
“westernization”. It is suspected to have cells in Northern Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It
exerts influence in the North Eastern Nigerian states of Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Bauchi,
Yobe, Taraba and Kano. It is suspected to have links with other non-state armed Jihadist
groups outside Nigeria. A range of conflicting narratives persist around Boko Haram and
the group’s origins, motivations and future plans remain a matter of debate
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine the suspected link between Boko
Haram insurgency and Non-state armed Islamist groups outside Nigeria. Besides, the paper
attempts to identify the cultural, social, economic and political motives behind the Boko
Haram insurgency in Nigeria.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Against this background, three questions drive this investigation. First, what are
the socio-economic, cultural, religious and political factors that motivated Boko Haram
insurgency in Nigeria? Second, how are Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria linked with N
on-State armed Islamists groups’ activities? Third, what are the policy implications to
public management, political leaders, socio-economic and culture for national
development? Before we examine these questions, let us define some relevant concepts for
our discussion in order to formulate the theoretical framework and contextualize our
analysis.
LITERATURE REVIEW
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Terrorism is increasingly understood as a political act meant to inflict dramatic and
deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of acute fear and despair (generally
for a political or ideological, whether secular or religious, purpose). The use of violenc e
is to create fear, often through the targeting of third parties and with the elements of surprise
and the undermining of very personal security, is a tool used by a variety of historical and
contemporary actors (Paret 1964). The term terrorism is difficult to define. However,
terrorism can mean the use of violence by states against subjects; isolated extremist acts of
violence; the use of violence in liberation and nationalist movements; and emergent
transnational configuration which targets western hegemony or values. Terrorism is, in most
cases, resentfully a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on
civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear for a political or ideological (secular or
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religions) purpose. It is also a criminal act and contravenes international law. For the
purpose of this paper, terrorism is defined as politically-motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents intended to
influence an audience or change a constituted state authority recognized by United Nations
by subversion.
The Non-state armed Islamist groups are religious extremists suspected to be
collaborating and instigating domestic insurgencies in most parts of the world, including
Nigeria in the pretense of pursuing global Jihadist’s ideology. For example, twelve (12)
top most active non-state armed Islamist groups have been identified in 2013 as having
links with domestic insurgencies occurring in most parts of the world. They include:
Barisan, Revolusi Nasional (Thailand); Taliban (Afghanistan and Pakistan; Islam Chatra
Shir (Bangladesh); Communist Party of India (Moist); Al-Quaida in Islamic M aghreb
(AQIM) in Algeria and Iraq; Al-Shabaab (Somalia); Ansaru (Algeria/M ali);
ISIS/Khorasan (Syria and Iraq); Communist Party of India (Moist); New People’s Army
(Philippines); Touareg Fighters (Mali and Niger) and Jabhat ql-Nusra (Syria) . Domestic
Islamist insurgency activities in most parts of the world have been fingered against these
non-state armed Islamists groups (Homeland Security News Wire 2014).
An insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority recognized by
the United Nations, when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as
belligerents (Roberts and Ash 2009). An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency
warfare and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population and by political and
economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgent’s claims against the
incumbent regime. However, the nature of insurgencies is an ambiguous concept. Not all
rebellions are insurgencies. There are many cases of non-violent rebellions using civil
resistance (Morris 2005). Where a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion, it may not be
viewed as an insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign
States and rebel forces. However, when insurgency is used by a State or another authority
under threat, “insurgency” also carries an implication that rebels’ cause is illegitimate,
whereas those rising up will see the authority as being illegitimate. Not all insurgencies
include terrorism. Morris argues that the use or non-use of terrorism does not define
insurgency, but that organizational traits have traditionally provided another mea ns to
describe the two. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger
than those of terrorist organizations provide social services and have an overt, even legal,
political wing. Their covert wing “carries out attacks on military forces with tactics such
as raids and ambushes, as well as acts of terror such as attacks that cause deliberate civilian
Causalities” (International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide 2014, 1
- 16). In this paper, we adopt US Department of Defense’s definition that insurgency is an
organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of
subversion and armed conflict.
Counter-insurgency, on the other hand, has a different type of operation to
insurgency. Though, insurgency and counter-insurgency (COIN) are two sides of
phenomenon, both have been called revolutionary war or internal war. Counter-insurgency
is, therefore, defined in this paper as an inter-locking system of actions – political,
economic, psychological and military aimed at neutralizing insurgency’s intended action
of overthrowing established authority in a country.
- 80 -

Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2015

3

Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2015], Art. 6
Journal of Public Management & Social Policy

Spring 2015

THEORETICAL FRAM EWORK OF ANALYSIS
Among the most important assumptions of the behaviorist school are the belief that
the root causes of war lie in human nature and human behavior and that an important
relationship exists between intra-personal conflict and conflict that pervades the external
social order. Among the prevalent micro-theories that we will review are: instinct or innate
theories of aggression, frustration – aggression theory, social learning theory and social
identity theory.
Early psychologists often postulate that there was an innate instinctual or biological
mechanism which would predispose humans towards aggression. This theory combined
elements of early psychological studies (Freud’s death instinct) and social Darwinian
theories regarding the fight for survival. This theory was subsequently discredited by
biologists who did not believe that such a mechanism exist.
Like most pioneering theories, the innate theories gave way to more sophisticated
and scientific hypotheses over time. One important development of this work was the
evolution of the frustration –Aggression theory. The basic assumption of the frustration –
Aggression theory is that all aggression, whether interpersonal or international has its root
causes on the frustration of one or more actors’ goal achievement. That is, the unful- filment
of personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand for
basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an
actor’s failure to obtain what it needs. The frustration-Aggression theory rests on the basic
stimulus–response (frustration –aggression) hypothesis (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990).
Terrorism can be driven by frustration, oppression, exploitation and social inequalities. The
use of terror and violence by terrorist groups is aimed to intimidate or coerce government
and the public in order to promote political, social ideological and religious or philosophical
objectives. Looking at Boko Haram, terrorist attacks in the Northern Nigeria, one can
affirm that the astronomically relative deprivations in terms of western education
acquisition and poverty, unemployment generation, and social inequalities, could have been
the reasons that trigger terrorism in that part of the country. In this context, aggression may
develop as a consequence of having been exposed to an extremely frustrating conditions
sufficient enough to provoke a sense of worthiness and hopelessness. Kukah (1993) argues
in favor of this position that Boko Haram members face complexities, contradictions and
challenges emanating from their inability to meet up with basic human needs like foods,
cloth and shelter. Soyinka (2012) agrees with this position and argues that, “economic
factors, such as unemployment, wasted resources, social marginalization and massive
corruption are responsible for nurturing the current season of violent discontent in Nigeria”.
It is, however, important to note that the existence of frustration does not always lead to
aggression, given that frustration may have other consequences other than aggression.
However, the insufficiency of causal link to aggression and other insights into human
behavior have led to the discrediting of the frustration-Aggression theory and the
subsequent development of the social learning and social identity theories.
Social learning theory is based on the hypothesis that aggression is not innate,
instinctual but actually learned through the process of socialization. One acquires aggressive
attributes by learning them at home, in school and by interaction with their environment
in general. Interaction in society helps to focus and trigger stored aggression against
economies. This is an important concept, particularly when the conflict is ethno -national
or sectarian in nature. Social learning theorists have tried to understand the relationship of
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the individuals in their environment and how this relates to sectarian aggression. Faleti
(2006) looks at the causes of terrorist act in Nigeria through the lens of psycho -cultural
perspectives. He contends that psychological, religious and other cultural contradictions are
the basis of conflict and that such conflicts are intractably perennial. Religious influences in
terms of Islamic jihads and solidarity with global Islamic fundamentalists motivate other
jihadists. The terrorist activities of Al-Qaeda, Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, Mali and Middle East motivate others to learn their mode of
operations and military tactics, which are eventually imported for domestic insurgencies
(Faleti 2006).
Another theory of interest is the Social Identity theory. This was developed by
Psychologist Henri Tajfel in 1998 and offers insight into the conflict in Northern Ireland.
The basic focus of the theory is that we create our social relations. There is a human need
for positive self-esteem and self-worth, which we transfer to our groups. We also order
our environment by social comparison between groups. The concept of in-group and outgroup is important in this analysis. The social identity theory has helped Social
Psychologists at least to recognize that individuals are different in groups and that it is this
difference which produces recognizable forms of group action. For example, ethnic
identities are very strong because of their composition as extended in kinship groups.
People in similar conditions, such as: abject poverty, unemployment, social inequalities and
marginalized groups can be united together to fight a common enemy. The kinship groups
are important in the development of in-groups and out-groups. This is a particularly
important concept when dealing with ethnic conflict or social inequality. Jerrold (2008)
attributed Boko Haram insurgency to psychology of group identity for marginalized or
isolated group of people.
The paper, therefore, adopts a combination of deprivation-frustration-aggression
theory, social learning theory and social identity theory as the framework of analysis for the
subject matter. The deprivation-frustration-aggression theory would be the major focus,
while social learning and social identity theories would complement it because of the
shortcomings of deprivation-frustration-aggression theory. The deprivation-frustrationaggression theory argues that aggression is the consequence of deprivation with resultant
frustration. Individuals are motivated to achieve life ambitions and fulfill certain soc ial
expectations, but when these expectations are thwarted, frustration sets in and this leads to
some form of aggression. In Nigeria, especially in the North East, majority of the people are
deprived of basic infrastructure; there are pervasive unemployment, abject poverty and
basic infrastructure. Consequent upon these, frustration and aggression result, which often
manifest in the form of militancy, terrorism and insurgency as witnessed mostly in NorthEast of Nigeria.
The justification for the use of the Social learning theory for this analysis is the
attribute that aggression is acquired by learning them at home, in school and by interaction
with their environment. The Boko Haram Jihadists were socialized to believe that other
religious denominations other than Islam are infidels. Hence, their interactions with
other Islamist groups in other parts of the world trigger stored aggression against
common enemies. This explains Boko Haram’s insurgency against western education,
Christians, churches, government officials and security officials.
The Social identity theory in the framework attempts to explain the social division
among individuals in different groups. Members of Boko Haram Sect see themselves as
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distinct people that would Islamize the Northern Nigeria within Global Islamic Jihad.
Hence, this difference produces group action and aggression against other religious groups
and Islamic organizations believed to tolerate other religious bodies in Nigeria. The paper,
therefore, adopts eclectic approach (that is, combination of deprivation-frustration –
Aggression, social learning and social identity theories) for our analysis. This is justified
because of socio-economic, religious and cultural identity experienced by citizens in
Nigeria, especially in the North East which have contributed to aggression against the state
and others perceived as enemies.
METHODICAL APPROACH
In the light of this, the paper adopts qualitative case study design. Data were
purposively sampled from secondary sources such as: available statistics from global
terrorism index reports, internet, journal articles, newspapers’ reports and textbooks.
Collected data were coded, categorized and analyzed, using documentary, exploratory and
descriptive analytical techniques, (percentages) to explain the link between Non-State
armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Historical and discourse
analyses were also utilized where necessary for explaining the history, conversations and
video messages of Boko Haram and non-state armed Islamist groups leaders. The
contemporariness of the Boko Haram issue in Nigeria justifies the use of historical,
exploratory, discourse, descriptive and explanatory techniques for our analysis and
consequent sets of generalization and conclusion.
LIM ITATIONS
Lack of statistical records, accuracy of data and research reports, especially the
collaboration between non-state armed Islamist groups with Boko Haram insurgency are
limitations to this inquiry. Besides, the logistics, time, money and lack of access to leaders
of Boko Haram sect and classified documents from government’s security officials on
fatalities that occurred due to the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria are other
aspects of limitations of the paper. Furthermore, the findings cannot be generalized to
other parts of the world where domestic insurgencies are taking place. However, the
paper attempts to achieve its objectives because of the methods adopted for the
investigation and analysis. Moreover, the inquiry being a case study would give us an
insight into the contributory factors to Boko Haram insurgency and provide us with
baseline data concerning the link between non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko
Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This would direct us on ways to resolve religious
fanaticism and extremism.
ANALYSIS
SOCIO-ECONOM IC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
North Central/ Eastern states in Nigeria (Kano, Adamawa, Bauchi, Bornu, Gombe,
Taraba and Yobe), which are currently under the shadow of insurgency are vast areas
with great potentials, but still remain the poorest part of Nigeria. Poor leadership,
unequal distribution of resources, lack of basic education, over-population, absence of
employment opportunities, including environmental degradation have contributed to
entrenching abject poverty in the North East. Now, let us examine the socio-economic
profile of four Northern states of Nigeria- target of Boko H aram Attacks and three
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Southern States not vulnerable to attacks to enable us capture the picture of state of
affairs in the socio-economic perspectives.
TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF
UNAFFECTED SOUTHERN STATES AND AFFECTED NORTH
CENTRAL/EASTERN STATES IN NIGERIA
STATES
GDP
GDP/Capital Unemployment Secondary School
$bn
(percent)
Attendance Rate
(2012)
(percent)
AFFECTED
NORTH
Central/Eastern
16.8
1,525
28
28
States
Kano
8
1,631
29.1
8
Borno
4.6
1,233
33.8
11
Adamawa
3.3
1,207
35.6
7
Yobe
31.2
2,916
8.3
85
UNAFFECTED
SOUTHERN
STATES
Lagos
11.3
1,859
25.5
75
Rivers
8.9
1,814
12.4
73
Anambra
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Poverty Profile Report (2012).
FINDINGS
(1) An evaluation of table 1 below shows that the North East has been particularly
affected by bad governance; social inequality; lack of economic opportunities;
lack of school attendance; unemployment and poverty in the region; compared to
State from Southern part of Nigeria. Hence, it became a fertile group for youths
to b easily recruited into Boko Haram Sect for terrorists’ activities in Nigeria.
(2) Empirical evidences analyzed from video tapes, reports, and statements of Boko
Haram leaders, leading to incidents of attacks as illustrated in table 2 and figure
1 show that Boko Haram Sect has links with Non-state armed Islamist groups
of AQI M /Ansaru;(A lgeria/Iraq); Al-Qaeda/Taliban (Afghanistan/Pakistan);
Al-Shabaab(Somalia); and Touareg Fighters (Mali).
DISCUSSION
An evaluation of the data in table 1 above shows the backwardness of North Eastern
States, the base of Boko Haram insurgency compared to states from the Southern parts o
Nigeria. The performances of states from Southern part of Nigeria on school attendance are
Lagos (85 per cent), Rivers (75 percent) and Anambra (72 percent). They have higher
school attendance rates than the states from North East, comprising Kano, which record
(28 percent), Bornu (8 per cent), Adamawa (11 percent), and Yobe (7 percent), respectively
The gap between the Northern and Southern states is now complicated by the insidious
targeting of education by insurgents. For example, the killing of students and kidnapping
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of “270 Chiboks girls” on 5th May, 2014, that attracted international attention.
Unemployment rates are also higher in the Northern states than the Southern states. Kano
records (28 percent), Borno (29.1percent), Adamawa (33.8 percent) and Yobe (35.6
percent); while, states from the Southern part of Nigeria have lower unemployment rates.
Lagos has unemployment rate of (8.3 percent), Rivers (25.5 percent) and Anambra (12.4
percent). The World Bank report of 2013 shows that there are massive and high poverty
and unemployment rates in Nigeria, especially in rural areas from 12 percent in 2006 to
24 percent in 2011. North East poverty rates amount to 69.1 percent absolute and relative
poverty level of 76.3 per cent, respectively; while the Northern Nigeria’s poverty level
is above 70 percent, than that of the South (Report 201 3).
It can be inferred from the analysis of table 1 that North Eastern states have been
particularly affected by lack of school attendance and unemployment rates because and lack
of economic opportunities and poverty in the region, compared to States from Southern part
of Nigeria. Besides, the failure of governance and corruption at the national and regional
levels compounded the economic development of North Eastern states made up of Borno,
Adamawa, Yobe, Gombe Taraba and Bauchi. From Nigerian Poverty Profile Report (2012)
the North East, base of the murderous Islamist group Boko Haram, had 69.1 percent and
76.3 percent absolute and relative poverty levels, respectively. While Northern Nigeria’s
poverty rate as a whole is above 70 percent- double that in the South. The North East has
been particularly hit hard as the lack of economic opportunities in the region drives people
into the arm of radical Islamism, leading to a vicious cycle of poverty and
underdevelopment. The problem is now being complicated by the insidious targeting of
education by the insurgents, an example of which was the kidnapping of over two hundred
(200) Chibok girls.
At the formative stage of Boko Haram movement between 2005 and 2008, the
leader, Mohammed Yusuf supported his disciples with one meal a day for each member;
established youth employment scheme, which enabled disciples to go into petty trading and
wheelbarrow pushing for a living. He also arranged marriage between the sect members to
give them personal dignity and self-worth (Shettima 2014). After the death of Mohammed
Yusuf on 26 th July, 2009, as a result of an encounter with police and military operations,
nobody took over this responsibility. The national and state governments from the region
could not fill the vacuum. Political elites from the region were busy pursuing power at the
national level, where they can benefit from corrupt practices in oil rentals, thereby,
neglected their region. Leaders at the federal level also failed to create jobs and encourage
school attendance for marginalized youths, especially the “Alamajiris” in North Eastern
states. This failure by national and regional political elites to create employment, distribute
resources equally, encourage school attendance and fight corruption created a gulf between
the rich and the poor, and provided a fertile ground for recruitment of these jobless youths
into Boko Haram Sects terrorist activities against the states, their institutions and citizens,
confirming our economic deprivation-frustration-aggression theory.
LINK BETWEEN NON-STATE ARM ED ISLAM IST JIHADISTS AND
BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA
In Nigeria’s context, the linkage between non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko
Haram insurgency can be captured from video messages, statements of Islamist groups’
leaders, newspaper reports, maps and available statistics of Boko Haram terrorists’ attacks.
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Data from these sources were content-analyzed, coded, categorized and subjected to
thematic, historical, discourse, descriptive and explanatory analyses, in order to explain the
pattern of linkage and collaboration between Boko Haram and non-state armed Islamist
groups. Table 2 and figure 1, below capture incidents of Boko Haram’s attacks and adapted
for our analysis and illustration.
Table 2: Terror and Suicide attacks by Boko Haram Insurgency and Fatalities
YEARS
Injured Civilians
Suicide Attacks of
Civilian deaths
2009
817
N/A
2010
84
N/A
2011
167
120
2012
220
78
2013
218
N/A
2014
2,560
235
Total
4,066
433
Source: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/boko-haram.
Figure1 below shows towns annexed in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa as at 1st
August, 2014. As these states were annexed, many civilians’ throats were slashed and Boko
Haram hosted their flag and declared Gwazoa Islamic Caliphate. Boko Haram leaders
even administered Sharia law for the Caliphate, as the incumbent Emir of the town fled.
This is typical of ISIS operational tactics and methods in Iraq and Syria. Incidents of
Boko Haram’s attacks target non-Muslims living in the Northern Nigeria and other
civilians. However, they are also know for attacking fellow Muslims to enforce their
interpretation of Islam. Espousing a strict hatred towards state authority, both to the
governor and the police, the group has threatened Jihad against the government. Often
targets Igbo civilians, a predominately Christian ethnic group. In 2009, an initiative by
the Nigeria military to eradicate Boko Haram led to the death of the sect’s leaders,
hundreds of their members and the destruction of their communities and properties

Fig. 1: Boko Haram-attributed attacks in Nigeria since July 2009.
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Source https://twitter.com /ogundamisi/status/455801622329716736/photo/1
In August 2009, about a week after the death of Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed
Yusuf, the interim head of Boko Haram organization, published an ideological declaration
regarding its goals and methods of operation. According to him, we support Osama b in
Laden; we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is completely converted
to Islam, which is according to the wish of Allah (Doukhan 2012). Several years later,
documents seized at Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottaabad in Pakistan showed that
top level Boko Haram leaders had been in touch with Al-Qaeda with the past 18 months
(Burke 2012).
In early 2010, Abdelmalik Droukdel, the leader of AQIM, publicly offered Boko
Haram assistance. In October 2010, AQIM’s media arm published a statement by Shekau, the
first time AQIM disseminated an official message from another group. On July 13, 2010,
Shekau issued another statement expressing solidarity with Al-Qaeda and threatened the US.
AQIM and Boko Haram officials have referenced growing ties in public statements (Ploch
2010).
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansaru in Algeria and A-Shabaab in
Somali collaborate and have links with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria from the
findings in documentary and discourse analyses. From Al- Jazeera Television Report of
June 14 of 2010, Abu Musab Abdal-Wadoud, the leader of AQIM said that “his group will
provide Boko H aram with support and weapons to build strategic depth in Africa”
(Aljazeera 2010). From US State Department, it was reported that Boko Haram has ties
with AQIM, and members of the Sect receive military training and even with Jihadist
group Al-Shabaab of Somalia (US State Department Report 2010).
In addition, indicative of Boko Haram’s possible link with AQIM is its posting of
video messages which conform to Al-Qaeda international jihad’s style. Shekau’s
November, 2012 video messages posted online, appealed to wider Jihadist communities for
support. In that video message, Shekau refers to fighters in Jihadist theatres as his
“brothers”. For example, Shekau addresses the soldiers of the Islamist state, in Mali, “our
brothers: Sheikhs in beloved Somalia; Our brothers: in Libya…..our brothers: Sheikhs in
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oppressed Afghanistan….our brothers: Sheikhs in wounded Iraq….our brothers: She ikhs
in wounded Iraq….our brothers: Sheikhs in Pakistan….our brothers: Sheikhs in
Yemen…our brothers: Sheikhs in usurped Palestine….our brothers and other places where
our brothers are doing jihad in name of Allah” (Roggio 2012).
In that video message, Shekau warned Britain, America, Israel and Nigeria that the
killing of Jihadist leaders will not defeat the groups. He further said that Boko Haram is
with our Mujahid brothers in their fight again the Jews and the crusader Christians. This
video message, according to Bill Roggio, an American commentator on military affairs is
similar to tapes issued by Somalia’s Al-Shabaab in 2008, when the group was making
overtures to join A l-Qaeda (Roggio 201 2).
Boko Haram also has close operational relationship with Ansaru, a splinter group of
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In many ways, Ansaru is the international
component of Boko Haram, although, it may not exist as distinct entity from it. When
AQIM retreated during French military intervention in Mali, the two groups integrated
(Heras and Zenn 2013). Boko Haram fighters also travelled to Mali in 2012, when the
militant Salafist groups AQIM, Mujao, Movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa and
Ansaral-Dine controlled the Northern part of the country and established closer relations
with these groups. The French intervention in Mali presented the group with possibilities
for training, combat experience and operational cooperation with these organizations.
Cameroon recently announced that their troop identified “two (2) Touareg Mali fighters
enlisted by Boko Haram among 100 militants killed at her border with
Nigeria”(Tchiroma 2014, 3) Touareg fighters fought in former Libya leader Muammer
Gaddafi’s army and went on to lead the rebellion that in 2013 cut Mali into two. Besides,
Boko Haram also relies on donations from Al-Qaeda and AQIM, in the form of money
and military hardwares. Islamist groups from Saudi Arabia also donate funds to Boko
Haram.
Furthermore, the scale and methods of attack suggested that Boko Haram had
adopted the tactics of AQUIM and ISIS currently fighting in Syria and Iraq. Boko Haram
attacked UN Building in Nigeria in Abuja on 26 th August, 2011. The bombing mastermind
was identified by Nigerian State Security Services as Mamman Nur, a notorious Boko
Haram member with a look to Al-Qaeda link who returned from Somalia before the attack
(Adigun and Gambrella 2011). The Nigerian State Security Service’s (SSS) claim fits
with June, 2011 statement by Boko Haram that some of its members had gone for training
in Somalia: “we want to make it known that our Jihadists have arrived (in) Nigeria from
Somalia where they got serious training on warfare from our brethren who made the country
ungovernable and forced the interim government to relocate to Kenya……despite the
armoured carriers that they are boasting of, they are no match with the kind of training we
acquired in Somalia (Oftedal 2013). Two videos later emerged purporting to show
members of Boko Haram preparing for suicide attacks, including Mohammed Abul Barra,
the suicide bomber of the UN building, launching a vague warning to “Obama and other
infidels”. The voice said to be Shekau calls the Un headquarter, a “forum of all the global
evil,” while also offering praise for Osama bin Laden”(Joy Online News 2011) This was
similar to AQIM’s bombing of UN building in Algeria on December 11, 2007 (Jebnoun
2008). Similar attack was carried on U N building in Baghdad (Iraq), which killed the
Chief of Mission, Sergio Vierra de Mello and caused the UN to depart from Iraq.
Again, the December 2013 night attach launched by Boko Haram fighters against
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Nigerian Air Force base in the city of Maiduguri, in which a number of security personnel
were killed and several aircraft destroyed is reminiscent of attacks by Al-Qaeda’s associates
on important military bases in other theatres of war- the Taliban’s attack on Pakistan Naval
Station Mehran in Karachi on May, 2011 and the Afghan Taliban’s assault on camp Baston
in Helmand on September 2012 (Matziko 2014). The recent annexation of 20 towns in the
states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, slashing the throats of their captors and hoisting of
their flags in conquered territories is similar to ISIS activities in Syria and Iraq.
The statements from video tapes, newspaper reports, tactics and methods of
operation reflect forms of linkage and collaborations between the non-state armed Islamist
groups and Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria. The recent military successes registered
by Boko Haram from 2013 to 2014, that resulted in 2,778 deaths, 235 injured citizens and
abduction of 270 Chibok girls (as shown in violent terrorist attacks in North East of Nigeria,
particularly Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, in table 2 and fig.1 below), compared to their
operations between 2009 and 2012, violent attacks which resulted to 1,288 deaths is a clear
indication that Boko Haram enjoys external military and financial support and cooperation
from non-state armed Islamist groups of AQIM, Ansaru, Al-Shabaab, Touareg from Mali
and Al-Qaeda/Taliban from. Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is justified with our map in
figure 1, showing graphical representation of insurgency attacks in North Eastern States
between August 1 and 31, 2014. It is obvious that the epicenter of 2013 and 2014 attacks
by Boko Haram insurgency and were more significant than pockets of violence recorded
between 2009 and 2012. This supports our thesis that religious, cultural (social theory) and
psychological (identity theory) factors contribute to Boko Haram’s collaboration wit h
Non-state armed Islamist groups to commit terrorist activities in Nigeria.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
Implications arising from the analysis and findings on social policy and management are:
First, the public management implication is that Nigerian government should tackle
the political and socio-economic challenges in the Northern part of Nigeria, especially by
greater engagement and financial empowerment of the discontented communities.
“Marshall Plan” should be formulated for the North Eastern states as was done in US
sponsored European Recovery Program of April, 1948 to December, 1951, aimed at
rehabilitating the economies of North Eastern states made up of Borno, Adamawa, Gombe,
Taraba, Bauchi and Yobe. Nigeria should also entrench good governance at the national
and regional levels in order to equitably distribute resources, create jobs for employment of
idle youths, build schools (formal and vocational), and encourage its attendance for skill
acquisition and empowerment leading to poverty reduction. Insecurity, poverty and
unemployment have significantly affected the members of the society, especially in the
rural areas. In failed states index, Nigeria was 14th in 2011, worldwide (Failed States Index
2011). Therefore, a new social compact with Nigeria citizens that encompasses an economic
program and projects that addresses poverty, unemployment, and should be addressed.
Government should partner with such body as UK Department for International
Development (DFID) to support the poor, which would help change the lives of many
girls, women, youths and assist in closing the huge millennium development goals’ gaps.
There is need to improve on governance and service delivery as well. Economic Reforms
at all levels must be pursued, so that money appropriated for development projects and
services actually deliver results. The anti-corruption agencies – the Economic and
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Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other offences Commission
(ICPC) should seriously check cases of frauds through which funds earmarked for
development end up in private pockets. Nigeria should also fight corruption seriously by
using surpluses from subsidy’s relief derived from fuel subsidy program to rehabilitate the
economy of North Eastern states. There must be political will to combat corruption and
entrench transparency and accountability in governance.
Second, many economic activities have been closed as a result of violent activities of
Boko Haram. For instance, “many telecommunication companies have lost their masts and
base transceiver stations in Plateau, Gombe, Bornu, Yobe, Bauchi, and Kano. Each costs
average of 40 million naira and 160 million to build a single mast” (Bisuga 2012 , 4-19).
Moreover, agriculture and foreign investments are affected. Many foreign investors are
scared of investing in the economy because of insecurity and kidnapping occasioned by
Boko Haram terrorist activities. Farmers are scared of going to farm (Bamidele 2012) .
Insecurity has created food crisis, such that prices of basic food items, like rice, yam, beans
and fresh tomatoes have risen (Azinge and Bello 2011). This is a serious economic
challenge as the cycle of poverty, hunger and unemployment would further drive the
disadvantaged and marginalized people in the area to crimes and religious extremism. The
impact of violence on hospitality industry is devastating. People have relocated hotel
businesses which have generating revenue from tourists have been relocated to other safe
areas in the South. Commercial and business activities have crumbled and some have fled
because of high level of insecurity. Banks and their customers are operating under difficult
situations and have reduced their business hours for security reasons. About percent of
industries have been shut down leading to scourge of unemployment. Small and Medium
scale industries have relocated to Abuja. Many people have lost their lives and others
rendered homeless. The global implication is that the activities of Boko Haram would affect
bilateral trade between Nigeria and other nations of the world, especially: Mali, Cameroon,
Niger, Republic of Benin, Ghana and other West African Countries.
Third, the killing, maiming of civilians, destroying churches and calling for
expulsion of Southerners and Northern Christians by the Boko Haram members is damaging
the North socially and politically. The trust and unity in diversity among Nigerians have
been eroded, and given way to mutual suspicion and hatred, which may degenerate into
self-determination agitation by minorities. This has political, social and cultural
implications for the national development.
Fourth, defense and security implication is that the police and military personnel
should be trained in urban warfare, intelligence gathering, and equipped with modern
military technological hardware. Inter-Agency rivalry and mistrust among military and
para-military service personnel should be eliminated, while, institutional flaws, such as
unsound recruitment should be addressed. Links and networks to extremist organizations
must be dis-connected through the establishment of multi-national joint task force to patrol
and secure porous borders. There is urgent need to disconnect the network of non-state
armed Islamist groups’ terrorist collaboration with Boko Haram Sects. This can be achieved
by establishing transnational and multi-national joint military taskforce with neighboring
countries that share common border with Nigeria, for example, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
This joint military taskforce would also help to check transnational crimes such as: human
trafficking, illegal migration, arms smuggling and infiltration of non-state armed Islamist
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jihadists into domestic militias. This is a big agenda for the government but not
insurmountable, if the political will is there to counter Boko Haram’s insurgency. This
would make external link between Non-state armed Islamist jihadists and Boko Haram Sect
to be disconnected in terms of getting arm supplies, mercenaries and funds. This will cut off
their supply chains and break the network of command and control. Complicity and
collusion between the security personnel, political elites with Boko Haram insurgency
should be meticulously investigated and all culprits exposed, prosecuted and jailed, if found
culpable. This would deter others in future sabotage and collusion by other sympathizers of
Boko Haram Sector.
Fifth, government should tackle the political and socio-economic problems of the
North Eastern part of Nigeria through dialogue and negotiation with marginalized
communities as alternative conflict resolution strategy to address the grievances of
insurgents. Insurgents are regarded as representatives of deeper issues or grievances within
a society, such as social inequalities, poverty, unemployment, corruption and bad
governance. This strategy if adopted would defeat insurgents’ propaganda of oppression,
social injustice and marginalization by winning the hearts and minds of the affected target
population to the side of government– a process that involves dialogue, compromise and
negotiation. Even though, we detest insurgents methods and tactics, their grievances are
often seen as legitimate, if pursued peacefully and through political means as done by
Philippines and likes of Nelson Mandela, Gandhi and Xanana Gusanao, who renounce
violence but seek same objectives through political and peaceful means.
Finally, Government should launch and sustain a concerted Civic education
program to halt politicization of religion, educate citizens to respect the rights of fellow
citizens. This would promote tolerance and encourage mutual respect in inter-personal
relations. Such awareness would help build religious tolerance, mutual respect for each
other’s rights and unity in Nigeria.
CONCLUSION
From the findings, it is obvious that there is wide discontent among people of North
Central/Eastern States of Nigeria, made up of Kano, Borno, Adamawa, Gombe, Yobe,
Taraba and Bauchi, because of economic deprivation, social inequality, unemployment,
poverty, corruption, and bad governance by both national and regional political elites. This
socio-economic deprivation has created a gulf between the “rich” and “poor”, snowballing
into frustration and leading to aggression on government officials, government agencies,
institutions and members of the society. The motivation to muster international support
from other oppressed Muslims in other parts of the world, made it possible for Islamist
extremists to find a fertile ground to recruit marginalized and frustrated yout hs in North
Eastern states, which has led to terrorist activities against the state with the aim of reforming
governance with Islamic or sharia laws. Hence, the collaboration and cooperation between
non-state armed Islamist groups and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.
Using secondary analysis, the paper has qualitatively and historically described the
interplay of socio-economic, psychological, religious and cultural (socio-economic
deprivation, frustration-aggression, social learning and identity framework) factors to
explain Boko Haram insurgency link with Non-state armed Islamist groups. Thus, the
geometric upsurge of unemployment rates, paradoxical poverty in the midst of plenty due to
corruption and illogical marginalization, suspicion, social injustice and bad governance
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snowballed into insurrection of Boko Haram terrorist attacks with its attendant socio economic and political implications for Nigeria.
However, we suggest that future study should interview and administer survey
questionnaire (if possible) to Boko Haram’s leaders to know their grievances, collaborators
and sponsors, besides being motivated by Islamic Jihads in other countries. This would
enable future researcher verify and replicate this study using quantitative analysis to
establish the linkage between non-state armed Islamist jihadists and Boko Haram’s
insurgency in Nigeria.
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